We need to revolutionize the way politicians are paid!

In the 1960s, the school of public choice revolutionized economic theory. Since then, politicians and civil servants are no longer theorized as pursuing the general interest, but rather their own personal interests. Of course, the entire political class is not devoid of altruism or a sense of service. Economic concepts do not claim to describe reality perfectly, but to offer analytical tools that come close. Let's admit that it's more realistic to postulate that elected and governing officials pursue their personal interests rather than the general interest.

When an actor pursues his personal interests, studying his behavior means looking at the incentive mechanisms at work. The main incentive weighing on our elected and governing officials is election. Elective incentives have two pitfalls: short-term action (electoral deadlines are close together) and partisan logics (elected representatives have groups of voters to satisfy more than others). The Rousseauist myth, on which our social contract is still partly based, postulates that the representative of the people will act in the general interest and not by summoning particular interests. Unfortunately, this is all too seldom the case in elected office.

Elections obviously remain the foundation of our political system, and democracy is a good in itself, as well as having a number of economic benefits (democracy stabilizes growth and fosters trust between players). However, in order to encourage elected representatives and government leaders to act in the long term and in the general interest, we need to supplement the current political system with new incentives. In the 1970s, the shareholders of American companies, wishing to align the interests of their executives with their own (the stock market price), found the solution: to pay executives in shares. Many employees have their income indexed to performance, so why not politicians?

Introducing variable, long-term remuneration would (partially) align executives' interests with an indicator of the general interest. The political class would then be encouraged to act in the long term, and not to do away with useful reforms carried out by previous majorities (since they would also benefit financially). The choice of the variable in question then becomes key to minimizing perverse effects. The general interest is not the pursuit of growth, and GDP appears to be too limited a variable. The HDI, developed by the World Bank, depends on too few criteria (life expectancy, school enrolment and standard of living). The work of Fitoussi, Sen and Stiglitz, under the previous President, sketched out a synthetic and comprehensive indicator of a society's state of well-being. Their conclusion puts the ball back in the political court to select priority subjects (education, health, wealth, security, etc.) and balance their index.

To reform politics, we need to go through politics. Establishing a new compass for political action, a new indicator, would appear to be a founding act, to be carried out beyond day-to-day choices by recreating a democratic moment (referendum, participatory consultation). Once the compass has been established,the remuneration of elected representatives should be indexed to it. To (finally) rationalize public action, let's institute a well-being index and political bonuses!